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The Relationship 
between Competition Law 
and Sector Specific Regulation: 
The case of electronic 
communications
 Alexandre de Streel *
Abstract – This paper studies the convergence and the remaining divergences of
European competition and sector regulation in the electronic communications sector.
It shows that (1) antitrust authorities are justified to intervene more intensively in the
electronic communications sector than in the other sectors of the economy; (2) the
remaining divergences between antitrust and sector regulation should determine the
scope of later, hence sector regulation should be applied when there are structural
(economic or legal) entry barriers or network effects; (3) contrary to the European
practice, it is better to base sector regulation on an independent economic concept
linked to the objectives of regulation (like the concept of “bottleneck”); (4) NRAs
should be cautious not to automatically extend a regulatory approach suited for infra-
structures laid down under legal monopoly conditions to new Schumpeterian infra-
structures and should be less hypocritical about their actions.
Keywords –  Telecommunications,  competition policy,  regulation,  European Union.
1  INTRODUCTION
In the European Union and thus in Belgium, there are two main instruments to
guarantee effective competition in the electronic communications sector (i.e. the
infrastructures for the services of the Information Society like fixed and mobile tele-
phony networks, Internet connections, cable TV, satellite connections) that have
converged over time, contrary to what happened in the US (Geradin and Sidak,
 * Faculty of Economics, University of Namur. This paper is partly based on de Streel (2007).
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2005). On the one hand, there is the antitrust law that has been applied extensively
to become a sort of ‘regulatory antitrust’. On the other hand, there is the sector
regulation whose mode of intervention has been aligned on antitrust law method-
ologies to become a sort of ‘pre-emptive competition law’. 
 Such evolution is interesting because it questions the (remaining) differences
between both instruments and their optimal coordination. This is an important
question at a time when the Commission has just tabled proposals to reform the
electronic communication sector regulation 1. This is also important for Belgium
where the relationship between the competition authority and the sectoral regula-
tors is one the tightest in Europe (see Devroe, 2007 and Valcke, 2007) and the
recent governmental agreement of Leterme I seeks for an optimal allocation of
competence between both types of authorities.
 The paper is divided in the following way. Section 2 gives a quick view of the
system. Section 3 goes in more details on the application of both branches of anti-
trust law (ex-post and ex-ante) since the last fifteen years. Section 4 deals with
sector regulation since its last modification in 2003. Section 5 tries to propose an
efficient balance between both instruments. Finally, Section 6 concludes. 
2  A QUICK VIEW OF THE SYSTEM
In the European electronic communications sector, public authorities rely on se-
veral instruments to discipline competitive behaviours, as shown in Table 1. (1)
Competition law that applies to electronic communications like to any sector of the
economy and that may be divided into two branches: ex-post competition law that
punishes anti-competitive behaviours (agreements and abuses of dominant posi-
tion) 2, and ex-ante competition law that prevents anti-competitive concentrations 3;
(2) Sector regulation that always applies ex-ante to prevent anti-competitive beha-
viour  4. 
 1. The proposals were tabled in November 2007 and are available of the website of the Commission:
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/tomorrow/index_en.htm
 2. Articles 81 and 82 EC and Council Regulation 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation
of the rules on competition laid down in Article 81 and 82 of the Treaty, O.J. [2003] L 1/1. In Bel-
gium: Competition Act coordinated on 15 September 2006, M.B., 29.09.06.
 3. Council Regulation 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between under-
takings, O.J. [2004] L 24/1.
 4. Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a com-
mon regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services (Framework Di-
rective), O.J. [2002] L 108/33; Directive 2002/20/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 7 March 2002 on the authorisation of electronic communications networks and services (Autho-
risation Directive), O.J. [2002] L 108/21; Directive 2002/19/EC of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 7 March 2002 on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications net-
works and services (Access Directive), O.J. [2002] L 108/7; Directive 2002/22/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on universal service and users' rights relating to
electronic communications networks and services (Universal Service Directive), O.J. [2002] L 108/
51. Those Directive have been transposed in Belgium by the Electronic Communications Act of
13 June 2005, M.B., 20.06.05.
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 Table 1: Competition law and sector regulation
Note: The shadow area is the triggering factor for each legal instrument.
On the one hand, competition law has one main objective which has become prev-
alent over time and is the maximisation of consumer welfare. This implies that com-
petition law aims at efficiencies (allocative, productive and dynamic) on the market
by ensuring the competitive structure is maintained and possibly strengthened
(see Ehlermann and Laudati, 199 and Huveneers, 2008).
To achieve this gaol, an antitrust authority applies ex-post competition law in
several steps: (1) It starts by defining the relevant market according to the Small but
Significant Non-transitory Increase in Price (SSNIP) or the Hypothetical Monopolist
Test 5. (2) It then determines whether one or several undertakings have sufficient
market power (in particular a single or joint dominant position, which is a level of
market power sufficient to behave to an appreciable extent independently of com-
petitors, customers, and ultimately consumers). (3) Finally, the authority determines
whether the undertakings with market power have committed an anti-competitive
practice (agreement or unilateral abuse). If it is this case, the authority imposes a
fine and/or behavioural remedies (to put an end to the anti-competitive practice) or
structural remedies if necessary and proportionate. A national Court may also pro-
vide for private damages to the injured competitor, customer or consumer. Thus,
an intervention under ex-post competition law is triggered by an anti-competitive
conduct.
 Competition Law –
 Ex post
 Competition Law –
 Ex ante
 Sector Regulation/
 SMP regime
Objective
Maintain competition
Increase competition
→ Market structure is broadly satisfactory
Increase competition
Mimic competition
→ Market structure is not 
satisfactory
Burden of 
proof to 
intervene
1. Market definition
2. Dominant position
3. Anti-competitive conduct: 
agreement or abuse of 
dominance (high)
1a. Notified concentration
1b. Market definition
2. Significant impediment to 
effective Competition (low)
(Conduct presumed)
1a. Market selection (very 
high)
1b. Market definition
2. SMP=dominant position
(Conduct presumed)
Remedies
Mainly behavioural
Fines
Private damages
Mainly structural Mainly behavioural
 5. Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition
law, O.J. [1997] C 372/5. For an application to the electronic communication sectors, see Com-
mission Guidelines of 9 July 2002 on market analysis and the assessment of significant market
power under the Community regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and
services, OJ [2002] C 165/6, para 33-69.
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Antitrust authority applies ex-ante competition law in several steps. (1a) First, a
concentration should be notified when it has a so-called Community dimension
(i.e. in principle total worldwide turnover of more that 5 billions EUR and single
European turnover of more that 250 millions EUR for at least two companies
involved). (1b) The authority then defines, according to the SSNIP economic meth-
odology, the relevant markets affected by the concentration. (2) It also determines
whether the concentration would significantly impede effective competition (in par-
ticular by creating a single or collective dominant position). Such assessment is
done in two phases with strict deadlines 6. If the authority has doubts or thinks that
the concentration would indeed significantly impede competition, the notifying par-
ties may propose remedies that should remove all competitive concerns (the rem-
edies should preferably be structural). Otherwise, the authority prohibits the merger.
Thus, an intervention under ex-ante competition is triggered by a notified concen-
tration which significantly impedes effective competition. 
 On the other hand, sector regulation has three (possibly contradicting) objec-
tives: promotion of effective competition, the internal market, and the users’
interest 7. However, the European as well as the Belgian laws give important
margin of discretion to the regulatory actors on the ranking of those objectives and
on the means to achieve them. In particular, the laws do not decide whether the
regulators should actively promote the development of infrastructure competition
as a soft industrial policy marker or merely control the market as a hard trustbuster
(on those ambiguities, see Granham, 2005 and Hocepied and de Streel, 2005).
However, it is generally admitted that the part of sector regulation that deals with
market power mainly aims to ensure efficiency by favouring competitive market
structure or by mimicking the results of a competitive market structure 8. 
To achieve those goals, a regulatory authority follows three steps when im-
posing obligations on the operators. (1a) It starts by selecting markets where
sector regulation would be more efficient than antitrust to solve competition prob-
lems. In practice, it does so according to three cumulative criteria (high permanent
and non-strategic entry barriers, no competitive dynamics behind these barriers
and inefficiency of antitrust remedies to solve the competitive problems) 9. (1b) Then,
it delineates the boundaries of the selected markets according to antitrust meth-
odologies (the SSNIP test). (2) It determines also whether an operator enjoys a
single or collective dominant position or could leverage a dominant position from a
closely related market. (3) If it is the case, it imposes proportionate regulatory rem-
edies to be chosen from a menu provided in the Access and Universal Service
 6. After the first phase (of 25 or 35 working days), the authority decides if it does not have serious
doubts that the concentration would impede effective competition, or conversely, it opens a sec-
ond phase of investigation. After this second phase (of 95 or 105 working days), the authority de-
cides whether the concentration would significantly impede effective competition or not.
 7. Article 8 of the European Framework Directive; Articles 6 to 8 of the Belgian Electronic Communi-
cations Act.
 8. European Regulators Group Revised Common Position of May 2006 on the approach to appro-
priate remedies in the new regulatory framework, ERG(06) 33, Chapter 4.
 9. Recital 27 of the Framework Directive, as interpreted by Article 2 of the Commission Recommen-
dation 2007/879 of 17 December 2007 on relevant product and service markets within the elec-
tronic communications sector susceptible to ex ante regulation, OJ [2007] L 344/65.
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directives (transparency, non-discrimination, accounting separation, compulsory
access and price control), or any other type of remedy with the prior agreement of
the Commission. In brief, an intervention under sector regulation is triggered by a
market that has the characteristics where competition law remedies would be in-
sufficient to solve competition problems. 
As we see, the sector regulation is aligned to antitrust methodologies. This
alignment was decided in 2003 because according to one senior Commission offi-
cial (Buiges, 2004) it was supposed to meet several good governance principles. It
makes the regime more flexible and based on solidly grounded economic princi-
ples that ensure regulatory decisions closer to the reality of the market. And this
increased flexibility should not be at the expense of legal certainty (as decisions will
be based on more than forty years of antitrust case-law), nor harmonisation (as
NRAs’ decisions are based on legal principles that are strongly Europeanised). The
system was also deemed to ensure a progressive removal of regulatory obligations
as competition develops in the different markets (market-by-market sunset
clauses) and facilitates the transition towards the mere application of competition
law when sector regulation will no longer be necessary. 
3 THE APPLICATION OF BOTH BRANCHES 
OF COMPETITION LAW TO THE ELECTRONIC 
COMMUNICATIONS SECTOR
3.1 Ex post competition law
The mode of intervention and the type of cases taken
At the European level, the mode of intervention of the Commission in the electronic
communications sector was based on broad sectoral approach, which is different
from the interventions in the other sectors of the economy based on a case specific
approach. In fact, the Commission behaves more like an industrial regulator than a
mere antitrust authority. Thus, it adopted three general guidelines that explained
how antitrust rules would apply to some competitive problems and that were not
based a stock of previous individual cases: in 1991 on the application of competi-
tion rules to the telecommunications sectors, in 1998 on the application of antitrust
rules to access agreement, and in 2000 on the application of antitrust rules to the
compulsory access of the local loop (i.e. the last mile of the fixed telecom network
where the economies of scale and scope are the largest).
The Commission conducted also six sector enquiries or quasi-sector enquiries
where the Commission sent questionnaire to all the operators to better understand
the dynamics of the marketplace and possibly identify anti-competitive practices
(see Choumelova and Delgado, 2004): in 1997 on the high prices for international
ALEXANDRE DE STREEL
58
calls, in 1998 on the high prices for fixed-to-mobile calls, in 1999 on the delivery
conditions of leased lines, in 2000 on the high prices for mobile international
roaming, and on the access to the local loop, in 2004 on the sales of sports rights
to 3G and Internet.
In a second stage and on the basis of the information collected during the sector
(quasi) enquiries, the Commission opened several individual cases (see Garzaniti,
2003: Chapter 6). So far, all cases cover pricing practices that were either exploi-
tative (excessive prices) or exclusionary (price squeeze or predatory pricing). Up to
now, only three formal decisions have been adopted: Wanadoo in 2003 for preda-
tory pricing on the ADSL market, Deustche Telekom in 2003 for price squeeze
between wholesale access price to the network and retail broadband tariffs, and
Telefonica in 2007 for similar price squeeze. However, this should not hide the fact
that Commission has been more interventionist in the electronic communication
sector than in the other fields of the economy. Indeed, the Commission opened
many cases that were either passed to the NRAs when they had competence to
act (e.g. cases of excessive fixed retention and termination rates) or settled infor-
mally between the Commission and the involved operators (e.g. cases of exces-
sive prices for international leased lines). 
 At the national level, more decisions have been taken than at the European
level, although the interventions of the NCAs vary a lot across countries (see Inter-
national Competition Network, 2006). For instance, the French Competition
Council has been extremely active, in particular in opening of the local access
market to stimulate broadband development and condemning cartel in the mobile
segment. In general, most national cases also relate to exclusionary pricing prac-
tices. 
The remedies imposed
In the majority of the cases, the Commission imposed behavioural remedies in the
form of reducing of excessive price or ending a price squeeze and very few fine. In
some cases, the Commission went further and used ex-post antitrust cases to
speed up liberalisation in the Member States that were reluctant to open their mar-
kets. For instance, the Commission closed in 1996 one case against Deustche
Telekom (for an alleged anti-competitive price squeeze between interconnection
charges and retail business tariffs) on the conditions that the German government
opened its telecommunications markets. Interestingly, neither the Commission nor
a Member State has ever imposed a full structural separation of the incumbent into
a network and a service divisions, but the United Kingdom has recently in an
unprecedented move imposed a quasi-structural separation of BT 10. 
 10. Ofcom Final statements of 22 September 2005 on the Strategic Review of the Telecommunica-
tions and undertakings in lieu of a reference under the Enterprise Act 2002.
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3.2 Ex ante Competition Law: 
Mergers and joint ventures
The type of cases notified
In the electronic communications sector, many concentrations have been notified
and decided by the Commission due to the re-shaping of the industrial landscape
in the aftermath of liberalisation (see Garzaniti, 2003: Chapter 8). In the mid-nine-
ties when telecom markets were progressively opened to competition, national
incumbents set up joint ventures to offer enhanced international services to multi-
nationals (e.g. Concert joint venture between BT and MCI or Atlas joint venture
between France Telecom and Deutsche Telekom). 
In the turn of the century when consolidation of ICT industries took place,
WorldCom (renamed MCI and then bought by Verizon) was the leader in the
restructuring of the Internet market by acquiring many rivals companies (e.g.
acquisition of MCI or Sprint). Similarly, Vodafone was the leader of the restructuring
of the mobile markets by acquiring many rivals (e.g. acquisition of Airtouch of the
US and Mannesmann of Germany). At the same time when convergence was
taking place, Internet and telecom companies merge or form joint venture to offer
fully converged services (e.g. merger between AOL and Time Warner and between
Vivendi and Seagram). 
More recently, there has been a consolidation in the pay TV industry (e.g.
NewsCorp buying Telepiu to form Sky Italia). Today, incumbents from Western
Europe are buying smaller foreign operators (e.g. Telefonica of Spain buying the
English mobile operator O2), especially in Eastern Europe. 
However, except in the Nordic country (with the aborted merger between Telia
of Sweden and Telenor of Norway and later the successful merger between Telia and
Sonera of Finland), there has been no fully-fledged merger between fixed incum-
bents because the customer demand is not yet sufficiently Europeanised, the reg-
ulation varies a lot across countries and the governments are reluctant to accept
such consolidation for national patriotism reasons. 
The remedies imposed
The Commission has been more severe (read interventionist) in the electronic com-
munications sector than in the economy as a whole because between 1990 and
2006, it blocked 2.2% of the ICT operations (instead of 0.6% on average) and
imposed remedies in 8.4% of the ICT cases (instead of 7 % on average). This is due
to several reasons. The first reason was to prevent a dangerous circle of self re-
inforcing market power between related markets, whereby parties to the concen-
tration would leverage their power from established markets (like the local loop) to
secure a dominant position on emerging markets (like the digital interactive service)
and, in turn, leverage back from the emerging market to strengthen their power on
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the established markets. The second reason was to support the liberalisation pro-
gram of the Commission. For instance, in the early joint ventures between incum-
bents to provide enhanced international services like Atlas, the Member States
concerned were encouraged to accelerate liberalisation in order to make possible
a clearing under conditions of those alliances. As explained by a senior Commis-
sion official (Ungerer, 2001), the dynamics of the process created a parallelism of
interest in accelerating liberalisation between incumbents (in order to have their alli-
ances cleared), Member States (in order to allow the development of the potential
of their national markets) and the Commission (in order not to be obliged to block
new services and new technologies). The third reason of the strict stance of the
Commission was to ensure non-economic policy objectives (like pluralism in the
media) in particular for the mergers involving content related services like the AOL/
TimeWarner merger in 2000. 
The types of remedies imposed by the Commission to accept concentrations
have been diverse. The Commission imposed structural remedies (like cable dives-
titure) that stimulate infrastructure competition for the parties to lose their dominant
position on the traditional markets and their ability to leverage and foreclose entry
in emerging markets. As the effects of these measures could only take place with
time, they were complemented by behavioural remedies aiming at forcing access
to key facilities (like content, fixed telecom infrastructure, mobile infrastructure,
technical services for pay-TV or interactive-TV services). Interestingly, many ex-
ante antitrust remedies have paved the way for the future regulation. For instance,
compulsory access to local loop was imposed in 1999 in the Telia/Telenor Deci-
sion and taken over by sector regulation in the 2000 Unbundling Regulation.
Note however that sector regulation has been taken into account when deciding
the appropriate remedies. Thus the Commission imposed more lenient remedies
or no remedy when the behaviours of the parties to a joint venture were under strict
control of a sector specific authority and there were less risk of abuse and
leverage. For instance, the Commission imposed less remedy in Concert Decision
of 1994 (joint venture between BT and MCI that were strictly controlled by the
British and American NRAs) than in Atlas Decision of 1996 (joint venture between
France Telecom and Deutsche Telekom that were not sufficiently controlled by
their respective NRAs). 
3.3 Appraisal of the extensive application of antitrust 
in the electronic communications sector
The extensive use of antitrust in the electronic communications sector has been
criticised by many. Veljanovski (2001) argues that the merger approach has been
too stringent because economic literature shows that anti-competitive leverage is
more rare than the Commission (lawyers) would think. Larouche (2000) argues that
competition law has been stretched beyond its reasonable limits and the institu-
tional and legitimacy settings of antitrust do not justify its quasi-regulatory role. More
generally, American authors like Audretsch et al. (2001), Evans and Schmalensee
(2001), Katz and Shelanski (2004) remind the dynamic characteristics of the indus-
tries and the necessary adaptation of antitrust policy.
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However, given the history of the sector, an interventionist stance of antitrust in
the electronic communications sector might be justified on static grounds (because
dominant position is pervasive in the sector) as well as on dynamic grounds (because
these dominant positions are often the result of past legal protection and not of pri-
vate investment decisions taken in a competitive environment and whose incen-
tives should be preserved). Moreover in sectors where effective competition does
not yet exist but is possible in the future, there may be a case for antitrust to actively
promote entry of competitors that are equally efficient - or even less efficient- than
the incumbents for two related reasons: on a overall market perspective, it may
pay in the long run to have many actors competing, and on a individual entrant per-
spective, efficiency may increase over time as the customer bases and the opera-
tion scale increases. Therefore, there may be an economic case for a ‘different
antitrust’ in sector where dominant position due to previous incumbency is preva-
lent. Yet, it should always be justified with sound economic reasoning (which was
not always the case in the merger cases so far) and it should be strictly limited to
the network industries that were developed under legal monopoly protection and
not extended to other sectors of the economy. 
4 THE APPLICATION OF ELECTRONIC 
COMMUNICATIONS SECTOR REGULATION
4.1 Ex-ante Sector regulation
The market segments regulated
As already explained, the markets selected for possible regulation should be those
where antitrust would be inefficient to solve possible competitive problems, which
has been interpreted by the Commission has markets fulfilling a test of three cumu-
lative criteria: high permanent and non-strategic entry barriers, no competitive
dynamics behind these barriers and inefficiency of antitrust remedies to solve the
competitive problems.
Applying this test in 2003, the Commission recommended the NRAs to analyse
18 markets 11. This list comprised 7 retail and 11 wholesale, hence is mainly made
of upstream access markets because there is no or low barriers to enter the retail
markets when wholesale regulation is efficient . On the fixed voice segment, the
Commission identified two retail access markets (for residential and business cus-
tomers), four retail services markets (same segmentation residential/business and
segmentation between local/national and international services), and three whole-
sale markets (call origination, transit and call termination) adding up to the whole
 11. Commission Recommendation 2003/311 of 11 February 2003 on relevant product and service
markets within the electronic communications sector susceptible to ex ante regulation, OJ [2003]
L 114/45.
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connection between two customers. On the fixed broadband data segment, the
Commission identified two wholesale access markets: access at the local loop
level and access at the bitstream level which is a bit further up in the network. On
leased lines segment, the Commission identified one retail market (the minimum
set of leased lines which corresponds to five types of leased up to 2Mbits), and two
wholesale markets (terminating and trunk segments) which adds up to the whole
connection between two customers. In the mobile segment, the Commission
identified three wholesale markets: access and call origination as well as termina-
tion which are the two extremes of the mobile network, and international roaming
which presents specific economic problems. In the broadcasting segment, the
Commission identified only one wholesale market for broadcasting transmission.
In general, the NRAs followed such market definitions, sometimes segmenting fur-
ther the market defined by the Commission (in particular for the broadcasting
market) and sometimes adding new markets 12. 
Re-applying the three criteria test in 2007 13, the Commission reduces the list
of markets to be analysed from 18 to 7 markets (1 retail and 6 wholesale). The
Commission maintains and merges the retail access markets. It removes the 4 ser-
vice markets because competition has increased on those markets and will con-
tinue to do if the regulation of retail access markets and of wholesale markets is
efficiently applied. The Commission removes transit and trunk segments because
they are potentially competitive given the intensity of traffic on those markets. It
removes the mobile access and call origination market as it was found to be effec-
tively competitive in the vast majority of the Member States. The Commission also
removes international roaming and broadcasting markets for very specific reasons
(the roaming market is regulated by a particular European Regulation since 2007
and the broadcasting market touch upon content issue, outside of the scope of
the SMP regime). It remains to be seen how the NRAs will react to this shorter list. 
The remedies imposed
Although, the NRAs had the choice between a list of five remedies (transparency,
non-discrimination, accounting separation, compulsory access and price control)
and the obligation to only choose the proportionate ones, they imposed in general
the full suite of them on all markets recommended by the Commission. In partic-
ular, they imposed price control at Forward Looking-Long Term Incremental Cost.
Most regulators applied also the ladder of investment which, as explained by Cave
(2006), consists of regulating the different rungs of an imaginary investment ladder
along the network (i.e. retailing, IP Networks, backhaul, DSLAM, local loop) and
only removing regulation of one rung when new entrants have climbed that rung.
Thus the policy aims not only to create a level playing field but also to actively sup-
port entrants. 
 12. Communication from the Commission of 11 July 2007 on market reviews under the EU Regulatory
Framework (2nd Report), COM(2007) 401.
 13. Commission Recommendation 2007/879 of 17 December 2007 on relevant product and service
markets within the electronic communications sector susceptible to ex ante regulation, OJ [2007]
L 344/65.
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Table 2: Markets susceptible to sector regulation under the 2003 
and the 2007 Commission Recommendations
Note: the markets crossed are those present in the 2003 Recommendation by removed in the
2007 Recommendation
4.2 Appraisal of the application of Sector regulation 
and its alignment on competition law 
methodologies 
After more than four years of implementation, the sector regulation which was
more based on theoretical thinking than practical experience has not fully delivered
the good governance principles it aimed for (flexibility, transparency, technological
neutrality, harmonisation, proportionality, and legal certainty) 14. In particular, the
principles of proportionality and legal certainty are no achieved. Indeed, there is an
increase of regulation as more market segments are regulated and more operators
are regulated on each segment. At this stage, I can not prove that regulators have
Retail markets Wholesale markets
Fixed Voice
1. Access for residential
2. Access for non-residential
3. Local and/or national services for residential
4. International services for residential
5. Local and/or national services for non-residential
6. International services for non-residential
8. Call origination 
9. Call termination on individual 
public networks 
10. Transit 
Fixed
Narrowband Data
Idem 8
Fixed
Broadband Data
11. Unbundled access (inclu-
ding shared access) to metallic 
loops and sub-loops 
12. Wholesale broadband 
access
Fixed
Dedicated access
 7. Minimum set of leased lines
13. Terminating segments 
14. Trunk segments
Mobile
Voice
15. Access and call origination 
16. Call termination 
on individual mobile networks
17. International roaming 
Broadcasting
18. Broadcasting transmission 
services
 14. For an overview of the state of implementation of the sector regulation: Communication from the
Commission of 19 March 2008, Progress Report on the Single European Electronic Communica-
tions Market 2007 (13th Report), COM(2008) 153.
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intervened beyond the optimal level because that would require a clear and articu-
lated definition of optimal regulation as well as a full cost-benefit that is outside the
scope of this paper. However, it is a fact that the never-ending expansion of regula-
tion does not match the deregulatory rhetoric of the European and national legisla-
tors and regulators. Also the strategies of the regulatory actors are not sufficiently
clear, in particular for the emerging markets: Do they want to strive for infrastruc-
ture-based competition or service-based competition? Do they want short-term
competition or long term competition? Do they want to do industrial policy or not ? 
One reason of such failure is the lack of clear objectives in the law (see supra)
and the inability or unwillingness of the regulators to arbitrate between conflicting
priorities. The legislator tried to hide the question of objectives and escape those
conflicts by aligning sector regulation with antitrust methodologies. However, such
methodologies do not evacuate the fundamental regulatory questions and worse,
they add difficulties.15 The main difficulty is that standard antitrust principles were
developed for antitrust practice in stable industries and need adaptations to be
applicable in the context of the sector regulation for dynamic markets. First as
pointed by Larouche (2000, pp. 203-211) and Richards (2006, pp. 206-209), stan-
dard antitrust principles are mainly suited to horizontal markets but need to be sub-
stantially modified to deal with vertical chains of production (which is the main
focus of sector regulation). For instance, standard antitrust principles would not by
themselves be capable of defining a derived non merchant wholesale market and
there is risk that the different services making a production chain are choked up in
numerous artificially narrow antitrust markets. Second as pointed by Audrestch et
al. (2001) and Evans and Schmalensee (2001), standard antitrust principles are
suited to stable industries where competition is mainly in price but need to be
adapted to deal with innovation and the Schumpeterian creative destruction com-
petition. Third as pointed by Evans (2003) or Wauthy (2008), standard antitrust
principle are suited to one-sided markets but need to be adapted to deal with two-
sided markets where there are strong interactions between each side of the mar-
kets.
In addition to this difficulty, there are several other drawbacks and risks with
the alignment on antitrust principles. First, the use of a legal concept is always
linked to the objective of the legal rule for which it is used. As the objectives of anti-
trust and sector regulation may differ (recall that the objective antitrust is the maximi-
sation of long term consumer welfare whereas the objectives of sector regulation
may be broader), the interpretation of a same antitrust concept may also differ cre-
ating legal confusion and uncertainty. Second, antitrust principles are complex and
have been under significant reform recently moving from a legalistic form-based
approach towards a more economic effects-based approach. Third and linked to
institutional issues, antitrust principles do not constrain the NRAs very much in
their actions (as many NRAs adapt them quite flexibly) but they do constrain the
 15. Note also that antitrust principles are insufficient to base sector regulation because they detect all
kinds of market power and are not able to screen the subset among them –hard core market pow-
er- that justify regulation. Thus, mere antitrust principles should be completed by other elements
that have nothing to do with antitrust principles, i.e. the test of three cumulative criteria.
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Commission in its review of NRAs’ draft decisions (as the Commission always
looks at the impact of its comments on its pending and future antitrust cases).
Therefore, critics like Larouche (2000:359-403) and Richards (2006:220) pro-
pose to base sector regulation on the concept of “bottleneck” 16. Indeed, the first
best would be to base sector regulation on specific concept (like bottleneck) linked
to the goals of sector regulation. This would not evacuate the fundamental regula-
tory questions as it is the case today and alleviate confusion between antitrust and
sector regulation objectives. 
A second reason of the regulatory failures is that the institutional design has
not been sufficiently thought through by the European legislator. In general, regu-
latory authorities have an incentive to over regulate (because of the well-established
problems of state bureaucracy implying that authorities have a tendency to increase
their activities), and the regulatory brakes in the current law (Commission review of
the NRAs draft decisions and possible national appeal against NRAs’ decisions)
are not efficient enough to counter-balance the tendency to over-regulate. More
critically, NRAs do not have incentives to take into account dynamic side of com-
petition (investment, innovation) but only the static side (evolution of price, number
of competitors) because the indicators on which they are evaluated are mainly
static (level of price, concentration index) 17. In other words, NRAs are performing
relatively well with regard to their incentives, but such incentives are not aligned
with today long term welfare of the consumers. Those incentives should be changed
by reinforcing the regulatory brakes and by evaluating the NRAs on more dynamics
indicators. 
5 OPTIMAL BALANCE BETWEEN RULES
After having presented the system of competition law and electronic communica-
tions sector regulation as well as its application during the last years, it is now time
to take a more normative approach determining what is the optimal balance between
both sets of rules.
Rationale for public intervention 
in electronic communications 
Public authorities should aim to maximise the welfare of their citizens and markets
are supposed to be the best means to ensure such welfare maximisation. Thus,
 16. Note that in the current sector regulation, there is already an implicit notion of bottleneck during
the market selection step with the three criteria test.
 17. See the yearly Commission implementation reports, available at http://ec.europa.eu/
information_society/policy/ecomm/implementation_enforcement/index_en.htm
More dynamic indicators are currently being designed by the British NRA to evaluate the impact of
the Strategic Review: Ofcom Statement of 8 February 2006 on evaluating the impact of the Strategic
Review of Telecommunications.
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governments should intervene only when the mere functioning of the markets does
not deliver this objective. 
Economists distinguish three types of market failure. (1) The first market failure
is the presence of excessive market power (like a monopoly operator) which may
lead to excessive price or too little innovation. Excessive market power is caused
by legal and economic entry barriers or by anticompetitive behaviours 18. (2) The
second market failure is the presence of an externality (like network externality or
tariffs-mediated externality) which may lead to under-consumption in case of pos-
itive externality and over-consumption in case of negative externality. For instance,
less than the optimal number of customers may decide to join a network if new
customers are not compensated, when joining the network, for the increase of
welfare they create to the already existing customers. (3) The third market failure is
the presence of information asymmetries (e.g. the absence of knowledge of the
price) which may lead to under or over consumption. 
In telecommunications, the two first categories lead to the standard distinction
between (1) the one-way access (or access model) which concerns the provision
of bottleneck inputs by an incumbent network provider to new entrants and (2)
two-way access (or the interconnection model) which concerns reciprocal access
between two networks that have to rely upon each other to terminate calls (Arm-
strong, 2002, Laffont and Tirole, 2000, Vogelsang, 2003). 
In addition, each type of market failure may be structural and result from the
supply and demand conditions of the market, or may be behavioural and artificially
(albeit rationally) ‘manufactured’ by the firms, leading to the two-by-two matrix
below. Since the decline of the Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm in indus-
trial economics, it is now recognised that non-strategic and strategic market fail-
ures are closely linked together and that structure influences conducts as much as
conducts influence structure. However, it remains possible (and useful when
choosing between the different instruments of public intervention) to identify the
causes of the non-efficient market results and to distinguish between structural
and behavioural market failures.
 18. The concept of economic entry barriers is controversial in the literature with two opposing views
explained in McAfee et al. (2004). The narrow (Stiglerian) view limits the barriers to the absolute cost
advantages of the incumbents (e.g. access to best outlet in town, or consumer switching costs)
but excludes all entrants’ costs that have also been borne by the incumbents (e.g. high fixed and
sunk costs). The broad (Bainian) view extends the concept of barriers to all factors that limit entry
and enable incumbents to get a supra-normal profit, hence includes absolute cost advantages but
also economies of scale and scope.
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COMPETITION LAW AND SECTOR SPECIFIC REGULATION
67
Table 3: Market failure susceptible to public intervention 19
Choice between competition law 
and sector regulation
To tackle these different market failures, public authorities dispose of several
legal instruments (in particular competition law, sector regulation, consumer law)
that they must combine in the most efficient way. Specifically to find the appro-
priate balance between competition law and sector regulation, regulators should
determine the main differences between both instruments, confront them with the
market failures to be dealt with and accordingly decide which instrument is the
most efficient in solving the market failure.
Many authors consider the main difference between antitrust and sector reg-
ulation is that the former aims at maintaining the level of competition whereas the
latter aims at increasing the level of competition. To me, the difference is not always
verified in practice as some antitrust decisions, in particular merger decisions whose
some have been endorsed by the Community Courts (in particular in the Energias
de Portugal case), aimed at strengthening the level of competition in the market 20. 
 19 This table is only a stylised and static view of the market reality that is more a starting point to raise
the relevant questions than a check list to provide definitive answers on the scope of public inter-
vention. Telecommunications markets are intrinsically dynamic and a rationale based on static view
may lead to inappropriate and over-inclusive public intervention. For instance, a high level of market
power does not always lead to long term inefficiencies justifying intervention.
Structural/non-strategic Behavioural/strategic
Excessive 
market power
Cell 1
- Bainain entry barriers: High and sunk 
fixed with uncertainty
- Stiglerian entry barriers: Important abso-
lute cost advantages (e.g. switching costs)
- Legal barriers
→ One way access (access model)
Cell 2
- Reinforcement of dominance
- Vertical leveraging
- Horizontal leveraging
Externality
Cell 3
- Network effects
- Two-sided markets
→ Two way access 
(interconnection model)
Cell 4
- Strategic network effects 
(e.g. loyalty program or tariff mediated 
externality
Information 
asymmetry
Cell 5 Cell 6
 20. On the differences between sector regulation and antitrust law, see also Laffont and Tirole
(2000:276-279), Katz (2004).
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I think that the two principal and related substantive differences between anti-
trust and sector regulation are that (1) sector regulation mainly deals with unsatis-
factory market structures whereas competition law deals with unsatisfactory firms’
behaviours, and (2) the burden of proof for sector regulation to intervene on the
selected markets 21 is lower than antitrust law. 
Because of the first difference (related to structure and behaviours), it is effi-
cient that sector regulation deals with structural market failures and competition
law deals with behavioural ones. Because of the second difference (related to the
burden of proof), it is efficient that the factor used to select markets for regulation
is set at a very high level because once a market area is selected, intervention is rel-
atively easy. In other words, the regulation should focus on market where the risks
of type I errors (false condemnation) are low and the risks of type II errors (false
acquittal) are high. This is especially important because the costs of type I errors
are large in dynamic markets 22. Taking both arguments together, any possible reg-
ulation should limited to cells 1 and 3 of Table 3, i.e. structural market failures due
to excessive market power and externalities 23. 
6 CONCLUSION
I would like to sum up with four main points that policy makers and authorities
should have in mind when intervening in the electronic communications sector. 
First, antitrust authorities are justified to intervene more intensively in the elec-
tronic communications sector (or more broadly in network industries) than in the
other sectors of the economy, but their interventions should always be based on
sound economic rationale and the same extensive approach should not permeate
those other sectors of the economy. 
Second, sector regulation should meet good governance principles: flexibility,
objectivity, transparency, harmonisation, proportionality and legal certainty. NRAs
should be cautious not to automatically extend a regulatory approach suited for
infrastructures laid down under legal monopoly conditions to new Schumpeterian
infrastructures and should be less hypocritical about their actions (by not invoking
the mantra of de-regulatory rhetoric when they are in practice increasing regulation
for good or for bad reasons). 
 21. The burden of proof for sector regulation to intervene is high when all steps of Table 1 are consid-
ered, but is low when steps 1 and 2 are passed.
 22. Hausman (1997) valued the delay of the introduction of voice messaging services from late 1970s
until 1988 at USD 1.27 billion per year by 1994, and the delay of the introduction of mobile service at
USD 100 billion, large compared with the 1995 US global telecoms revenues of USD 180 billion/year.
 23. In addition to the two substantive difference between antitrust and sector regulation, the main in-
stitutional difference is that sector regulation is only applied by national authorities whereas anti-
trust law is applied by national authorities but also a European one (the Commission). With that,
some consider that antitrust law may apply in addition to sector regulation when NRAs have not
performed their tasks adequately. That was the case in the Deutsche Telekom Decision in 2003
and of the Telefonica Decision of 2007. However, with Larouche (2005) I think it is a better institu-
tional design that regulatory decisions are controlled directly by judicial bodies (a national Court or
ultimately the European Court of Justice) instead of an antitrust authority.
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COMPETITION LAW AND SECTOR SPECIFIC REGULATION
69
Third, sector regulation and competition law are converging but some impor-
tant divergences remain and those should determine the scope of sector regula-
tion. Thus sector regulation should only be applied when it is more efficient than
antitrust to solve market failures, i.e. when there are structural (economic or legal)
entry barriers or network effects. 
Fourth, it would have been better not to align sector regulation on antitrust
principles, but to base regulation on an independent economic concept linked to
the goals of regulation (like the concept of bottleneck). In any case, the alignment
of methodologies should not necessarily lead to alignment of objectives, and should
not evacuate the fundamental regulatory questions to be solved: Do regulators
want to strive for infrastructure-based competition or service-based competition?
Do they want short-term competition or long term competition? Do they want to do
industrial policy or not ?
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